Acute Care Hospital Bed Supply in the Time of Pandemic : Just in Time Inventory vs. Pandemic Preparedness

Thank you to Eric E. Johnson of the University of Oklahoma College of Law for putting together a Second Mini-Conference on Coronavirus and Law on April 15, 2020.  Eric was gracious enough to allow me to choose to talk about Acute Care Hospital Bed Supply in the Time of Pandemic.  All of the other participants were gracious enough to listen and ask questions, in turn. I thank them as well. 

I chose acute care hospital bed supply as my topic because of a string of op eds I noted from around the country faulting earlier hospital merger and acquisition policies that, apparently, created the tight supply of acute care hospital beds laid bare by Coronavirus  emergent hospitalizations.  Commentators in Boston, Chicago, New York, and San Francisco all implied that acute care hospital bed supply was too tight, in light of past decisions to allow mergers or acquisitions or closures.  All of this led me to the question of just how tight we want acute care hospital bed supply to be?

Don't look in conventional antitrust law on merger analysis for language on leaving some excess acute care bed supply in the system in preparation for surge or pandemic needs, because you won't find it.  This also made we wonder why we have no way to talk about these things or why we lack the vocabulary to ask these questions.

Practice experience reminds me of a few situations where opponents of mergers had mixed in, along with other grounds, the cry that wringing all the excess acute care bed capacity of the system would leave us ill prepared for another 1918-style flu epidemic or 1908-style earthquake.  Such arguments typically gained little traction, as there was no consensus that surge or pandemic emergency capacity had any role to play in conventional merger analysis's focus on technical and scale efficiency in acute care hospitals and the goal of greater competition by wringing excess supply out of the system. 

But we are humbled now or as humbled as we may be for some time by the incredible surge in demand the leaking stories of people, particularly people who are low income, being sent home with fever, pneumonia, and instructions to self-monitor which turned into instructions to self-monitor unto death.  Is what was formerly seen as excess capacity really idle capacity necessary for pandemic or mass disaster preparation and ought merger analysis take some cognizance of the interest of the acute care hospital bed consuming public in having some flex in the bed supply?

I am still thinking about this.  x-posted: lawgarithmic.com

 

 

 

 

Do Regulators Actually Ever Shut Down a Nursing Home?

The story about the Covid 19 ridden nursing home in Orinda just gets worse and worse.  Turns out that facility, along with several other facilities under the same ownership, have a history of staffing, sanitation, and safety violations.  It ain't pretty.  Yet, even the owner-operator's fraudulent acquisition of her operator's license (purportedly by transcript fraud) was enough to get anyone's attention.  All of this was apparently not even bad enough to get them listed on this February, 2020 "Special Focus Facility Program" list put out by CMS.  

That's because we tuck people away in nursing homes and tend to operate on what could kindly be described as an out of sight – out of mind theory of quality control. It is, after all, seen as excessively burdensome to emphasize infection control in such group settings.  But, now that we know that Covid 19 contagion rampant there could threaten us all, we are, to put it gently, mightily concerned.  

 

Hospitals as Covid-19 Disease Vectors

"For example, we are learning that hospitals might be the main Covid-19 carriers, as they are rapidly populated by infected patients, facilitating transmission to uninfected patients. Patients are transported by our regional system,1 which also contributes to spreading the disease as its ambulances and personnel rapidly become vectors. Health workers are asymptomatic carriers or sick without surveillance; some might die, including young people, which increases the stress of those on the front line."

From a recent journal article by practitioners in and near Bergamot, Italy.

Who’d of Thunk It?

Mr. Trump had no explanation for why his White House shut down the Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense established at the National Security Council in 2016 by President Barack Obama after the 2014 Ebola outbreak, stammering to suggest the coronavirus had been a surprise.

“Well, I just don’t think — I just don’t think that somebody is going to — without seeing something, like we saw something happening in China,” Mr. Trump said. 

Maybe we should just start with, who is thinking — at all? Let's start there.

What Do We Mean When We Talk About “Fault” in Relation to the Corona Virus?

“They would like to have the people come off,” he said. “I would like to have the people stay. I told them to make the final decision. I would rather — because I like the numbers being where they are. I don’t need to have the numbers double because of one ship that wasn’t our fault. And it wasn’t the fault of the people on the ship either. OK? It wasn’t their fault, either. And they are mostly Americans.”

Americans, including our President, are so focused on individual responsibility for health outcomes of any kind, that we can't help but reach for "fault" talk even when discussing an epidemic or pandemic.

Grocery Stores as the Harbinger of Gentrification

Historian Marcia Chatelaine's appearance on NPR to discuss her book: Franchise: The Golden Arches in Black America was the kind of discussion that makes you sit in your driveway listening to NPR long after you've reached home.  The powerful place of McDonald's as community center in some low income neighborhoods, the fact that grocery stores are often the harbinger of gentrification, and the powerful imagery of openness and access that McDonalds presents all make me think hard about food policy.  Brava!